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Abstract
In this paper, we test empirically whether there is a relationship between
corporate income taxes and CEO bonus  payments. Using Compustat and
ExecuComp data from 1992 to 2010, we find mixed results. Looking at the
whole sample, the average bonus contract rewards tax savings excessively in
comparison to other determinants of corporate net income. A possible  ex-
planation is that managers require to be compensated for the additional risk
inherent in running an aggressive tax strategy. In accordance with previous lit-
erature, we document a substantial heterogeneity in compensation practices
across industries. It appears that our main result is driven by firms in the In-
dustrial and Retail sectors. We further find that companies with greater tax
planning opportunities, for example by virtue of size or operations abroad, are
more likely to condition the CEO’s bonus on corporate income taxes.
Keywords: CEO incentives, executive compensation, tax avoidance.
JEL: H25, H26, M41, M52.
*Tinbergen Institute and Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam. E-mail:
schmittdiel@ese.eur.nl
1 Introduction
One of the central questions in Corporate Governance is how to align the incentives
of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with those of the owners of a firm. An appar-
ent method to do so is tying the executive’s compensation to corporate performance,
for example by means of equity pay or a bonus based on accounting measures.1 Pre-
vious studies confirm that CEO pay is indeed related to firm performance and find
total CEO wealth to increase by median values of 3.25 dollars (Jensen and Murphy
1990) or 5.29 dollars (Hall and Liebman 1998) following a 1,000 dollar increase in
shareholder wealth.2 Not only do the level and the composition of executive com-
pensation vary greatly across firms and industries (cf. Murphy 1999), but they also
change quite remarkably over time (see Figure 1).
Investors care about the return on their investment in a firm, that is, the sum
of stock price changes and paid dividends, relative to the principal investment. As-
suming the CEO disposes of means to reduce his company’s tax obligations and that
the expected gains of such conduct exceed the expected costs for the shareholders,
it would be rational for the owners of a firm to set corresponding incentives for
top management. Dyreng et al. (2008) note that “[a]voiding taxes does not imply
anything improper. Indeed, firms (and individuals) can avoid Federal [sic] income
taxes through means as simple as holding municipal bonds that generate tax-exempt
interest income” (p. 65). Apart from making use of such tax exemptions, firms
may reduce their tax burden by exploiting differences in local tax rates, by financ-
ing themselves with debt rather than equity, or simply by misreporting revenue or
1Executive compensation packages can generally consist of a number of parts: a base salary, an an-
nual bonus based on accounting measures, stock options, long-term incentive plans such as restricted
stock plans, and other benefits such as perquisites, insurances, pensions, or severance pay.
2These studies focus on changes in executive wealth rather than just on income in order to take
into account the effect of corporate performance on the CEO’s equity holdings.
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Figure 1: Components of CEO Compensation
Level and structure of CEO Compensation in S&P 500 firms, in thousands of year-2000 dollars
(Source: Frydman and Jenter 2010).
business expenses.3 If the CEO can avail himself of such a measure to reduce tax
payments, an apparent question is how the shareholders can effectively encourage
such behavior.
Firms can ensure that the CEO acts in the shareholders’ interest by making him
a shareholder himself (for example by paying him in firm equity and limiting his
possibility to sell it). Nonetheless, according to Murphy (1999) almost all for-profit
companies make use of bonuses in addition to or instead of equity incentives. As-
suming the stock price correctly evinces the value of a firm, equity incentives im-
plicitly motivate the CEO to reduce corporate tax payments, since this will lead to a
higher net income of the company, and thus to a higher firm value. However, it is un-
clear whether bonus contracts set such incentives. This depends on what accounting
measure a bonus is based on. The literature suggests that the most prevalent perfor-
3Corporate tax rates do not only vary internationally, but also between U.S. states and municipal-
ities.
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mance measure used in bonus contracts is firm profits. Murphy (2000) finds 91% of
large firms to tie the CEO’s bonus to either net or gross accounting profits. Ittner
et al.’s (1997) text-search of proxy statements only finds 25.3% of firms to use pre-tax
and 27.2% post-tax income as performance measures. It must be noted, however,
that other measures can indirectly set incentives to increase profits and/or reduce
taxes.4
In this paper, we test empirically whether CEOs’ bonus payments are related
to corporate income taxes. We do so by running regressions of bonus payments
on income taxes, controlling for firms’ net profits. While public corporations are
required to disclose the amount and composition of executive compensation, the
exact remuneration contract is generally unobserved. Studies on managerial bonus
contracts therefore rely on information that some firms communicate voluntarily,
for example in their proxy statements. We add to the literature in two ways. First,
we make use of panel data with a sample of firms that is much broader than that in
other studies which are constrained by the number of firms for which enough infor-
mation is available. This approach gives our study more external validity. Second,
our approach of estimating the nature of bonus contracts, rather than conducting a
survey or otherwise making use of information controlled by the firm, allows us to
rule out concerns such as nonresponse bias, selection bias, and even firms or their
consultants intentionally giving misleading information (cf. Slemrod 2007). The
next section provides an overview of the related literature. Section 3 describes the
data and the econometric framework. Results are presented and discussed in Sec-
tion 4, followed by a concluding section.
4According to Ittner et al. (1997) and Murphy (2000), other popular financial performance mea-
sures in bonus plans are earnings per share, return on equity, sales, cash flow, return on assets, and
cost reduction.
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2 Related Literature
If corporate income taxes were determined in an inexorable fashion, there would be
little justification for conducting our study. However, recent research suggests that
companies have an array of possibilities to manipulate their income tax payments,
both legally and illegally. This section summarizes three streams of literature, begin-
ning with some theoretic implications of including tax considerations in a principal-
agent framework. The second group of studies aims at investigating whether firms
pay less taxes when the CEO is incentivized accordingly, which further motivates
our study. Finally, we derive some indications for our empirical analysis from two
papers that examine what kind of firms engage in income tax evasion.
Theory of Incentives to Avoid Taxes
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) develop a model of individual tax evasion based
on Becker’s (1968) notion that a person will commit an unlawful act whenever the
expected utility from doing so exceeds the expected disutility of punishment. In a
corporate setting ownership and control are separated, making the problem more
complex. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) use a costly state falsification framework in
the formalization of the contract between shareholders and the executive, in which
the executive can evade corporate taxes legally (costless) or illegally (costly to share-
holders and executive).5 The degree to which he can evade taxes legally is a random
variable and private information for him. The central finding of the model is that
illegal tax evasion decreases with higher penalties to either shareholders or the ex-
ecutive, but that penalizing the executive is generally more effective. This is so
5Crocker and Slemrod (2005) base their arguments on the contract of the Chief Financial Officer
(CFO). While the CFO may have a more direct say in a firm’s tax issues, Phillips (2003) and Dyreng et
al. (2010) support the view that focussing on the CEO can be justified with his predominant position
in the company.
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because the information asymmetry concerning the possibilities of legal tax evasion
necessitates a second-best compensation contract. Note that Crocker and Slemrod
(2005) assume not only the shareholders but also the executive to be risk-neutral
agents.
This last concern is addressed by Chen and Chu (2005) who model the executive
to be risk-averse. Unlike Crocker and Slemrod (2005), they further assume that the
firm owners can observe whether or not illegal tax evasion is carried out. When tax
evasion is detected by the authorities, the CEO incurs a cost.6 However, firm owners
cannot credibly condition the compensation contract on whether or not tax evasion
is detected, because the contract would not hold up in court.7 As a consequence,
the shareholders must reward the executive for tax evasion ex ante, regardless of
whether or not it is detected and punished. While this signifies an efficiency loss
compared to a scenario where detection is contractable, it may still be worthwhile
for firm owners to incentivize tax evasion.
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a model that incorporates the two fol-
lowing considerations: 1) Incentive compensation aligns the executive’s incentives
with those of the shareholders, so that he tries to reduce tax payments whenever
this increases firm value. 2) Tax sheltering and managerial rent extraction are com-
plementary activities. Thus, it is unclear whether incentive compensation leads to
an aggressive tax strategy or not.
6The paper also studies the case of a non-liable CEO, which we do not discuss for the sake of
brevity.
7The relevance of this argument can be questioned, however. First of all, it does not play a role in
legal tax evasion. Second, the CEO may enforce the payment of higher compensation when illegal
evasion is detected, for example by threatening to disclose other information that is harmful to the
shareholders.
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Do such Incentives Work?
One commonly used measure of the extent of tax avoidance is the book-tax gap:
the difference between income reported to shareholders (as laid out in the United
States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and that reported to tax author-
ities. Another, very similar, approach is to look at the effective tax rate (ETR) of
a firm which is equal to the ratio of cash taxes to pretax income. In their empiri-
cal application with Compustat and ExecuComp data from the years 1993 to 2002,
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that higher stock-based compensation is associ-
ated with a lower level of tax sheltering, as measured by the book-tax gap that does
not stem from accounting accruals. They argue that this negative effect is driven by
poorly-governed firms, for which the authors assume that there is a positive feed-
back between diversion of funds and tax sheltering, in other words: an increase in
the manager’s participation in firm value will lead him to divert less funds, which, in
weakly-governed firms, is assumed to make tax sheltering more costly.8
Rego and Wilson (2012), on the contrary, state that for an executive to follow an
aggressive tax strategy, high levels of equity risk incentives need to be put in place.
They argue that if the CEO holds stock options of his firm, their value increases with
stock return volatility so that he is incentivized to undertake risky activities with a
positive net present value; one such risky activity may be an aggressive tax strategy.
Using data from Compustat, ExecuComp, and CRSP for the years 1992 to 2006,
Rego and Wilson (2012) find a positive relationship between several measures of tax
aggressiveness, such as discretionary book-tax differences or the average ETR, and
8They offer a case study to illustrate the intuition of such a positive feedback mechanism between
tax sheltering and diversion of funds, stating that “features of [a tax-oriented] transaction designed
to make it more opaque to the capital markets were justified on the basis of secrecy, supposedly
necessitated by tax objectives” and that “actions that served as the origins of the conspiracy to mislead
the auditors were also justified on this same basis” (p. 157).
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the manager’s equity risk incentives, which are modeled as the change in the value
of stock options held by the CEO. Similar in spirit, Armstrong et al. (2012) make
use of a proprietary data set from a human resource consultant for the years 2002 to
2006 and find a positive relation between several measures of tax avoidance and the
compensation mix. They define this variable as the ratio of variable compensation
to total compensation.9 While this can serve as an approximation of the intensity
of the manager’s general incentivation, it is unclear what part of it puts it in the
executive’s interest to reduce his firm’s income tax payments.
In summary, the empirical evidence on whether equity risk incentives can in-
duce corporate tax avoidance is unclear. Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) analysis can
serve as one explanation why shareholders cannot always rely on equity incentives
to encourage tax evasion. As a result, they may choose to resort to bonus contracts
that incentivize management to run an aggressive tax strategy. Another explanation
could be that shareholders choose a bonus plan to set these incentives because ac-
counting measures are a less noisy signal of managerial actions than the stock price
(cf. Murphy 1999).
Focussing on accounting-based compensation, Phillips (2003) investigates if after-
tax incentives - that is, compensation that is based on an after-tax accounting mea-
sure - lead executives to conduct a more aggressive tax strategy. Using a combination
of Compustat and proprietary survey data, he estimates a two step model with the
firm’s ETR and dummy variables indicating whether the corresponding executives
are remunerated based on after-tax measures as endogenous variables. The under-
taken survey allows him to include not only an indicator variable for the CEO’s com-
9Note that this approach is similar to that of Desai and Dharmapala (2006), even though it yields
contrary results. The difference is that Desai and Dharmapala (2006) use the ratio of stock options
to total compensation, rather than the ratio of variable compensation (stock options and bonus) to
total compensation.
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pensation, but also for that of business unit managers within the firm. It was sent to
829 firms, of which 209 yielded usable data, but the author states that (unreported)
descriptive statistics suggest that there is no nonresponse bias as measurable with
some observable variables. The surveyed firms do, however, significantly differ from
the whole sample of Compustat firms in terms of size, capital intensity, leverage,
and ETR. Having about two-thirds of CEOs and one third of business unit man-
agers compensated based on after-tax measures, he finds that this leads to a lower
ETR in the case of business unit managers, but not for CEOs.
Phillips (2003) does, however, postulate that when the CEO considers the tax
department as a profit center, he will hence make sure that the business unit man-
agers also have the proper incentives. Dyreng et al. (2010) also note that CEOs
may indirectly influence corporate tax policy by “setting the tone at the top” (p.
1164). Gaertner (2013) offers an alternative explanation for the lack of a relationship
between CEOs’ after-tax incentives and ETRs in Phillips’ (2003) study: low statisti-
cal power. Gaertner (2013) overcomes this problem by hand-collecting information
on whether or not a CEO receives incentives on an after-tax basis from compa-
nies’ proxy statements. This generates a larger sample than that in Phillips’ (2003)
study and comes about with higher statistical power. Gaertner’s (2013) analysis yields
two main results. First, he does indeed find a negative relation between companies’
ETRs and the use of after-tax incentives in CEO compensation. Second, he shows
that CEO cash compensation is higher in firms that set after-tax incentives, ceteris
paribus. He rationalizes this result with an increased risk for the CEO, for which he
demands to be compensated.
Which Firms Avoid Taxes?
Turning to the question of which firms engage in tax evasion, Dyreng et al. (2008)
find that while the average firm in their 1995 to 2004 Compustat sample hardly re-
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duces its tax burden below the statutory tax rate of 35 percent, about a fifth of these
firms do so by maintaining an ETR of less than 20 percent. Their exploratory anal-
ysis yields 1) that these tax-avoiders are concentrated in service industries and in oil
and gas extraction and 2) that large firms with incorporation in a tax haven, a high
ratio of physical capital, or high leverage tend to have a lower ETR. However, they
leave out the question of whether and how CEOs are incentivized to produce these
outcomes.
Atwood et al. (1998) analyze a cross section of Compustat data and conduct a
text-search of the corresponding proxy statements. They generate a binary variable
indicating whether the bonus determinants mentioned in the proxy statements are
pre-tax or post-tax measures and aim to explain this variation in the choice of per-
formance indicators with the firms’ tax planning opportunities. Firms that employ
“earnings”, “net income”, “return on assets”, or “return on equity” as performance
measures are considered to give after-tax incentives, with all other cases considered
to induce before-tax incentives. Note that firms which use both before- and after-
tax indicators are dropped from the sample. In their 1993-data, roughly two-thirds
of the 406 firms employ after-tax measures, with the rest using before-tax account-
ing measures. Their results suggest that bigger, international, more capital intense,
more diverse, and less levered firms have more means of manipulating tax obliga-
tions and are hence more likely to employ net rather than gross performance mea-
sures. The rationale behind the effect of these firm characteristics on tax planning
opportunities and thus on the performance measure choice is as follows:
• Size: the bigger a firm is (measured in total sales or total assets), the higher are
potential savings from proactive tax planning. As an example, consider a small
firm whose total tax burden is so low that incentivizing the CEO to reduce it
would be too costly.10
10This argument requires a non-linear relationship between scale and the costs of tax reduction,
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• Multinational  Operations: international  firms  can  allocate  their  income-
generating processes to jurisdictions with lower corporate taxes.
• Capital Intensity: while a general investment tax credit has been abolished in
the U.S. in 1986, firms that use relatively much capital in their operations have
more tax planning opportunities “due to timing issues regarding asset acqui-
sitions, asset dispositions and differences in the tax consequences of buying
versus leasing” (Atwood et al. 1998, p. 31) and because they can exploit differ-
ences in local and state taxes.11
• Diversity: firms with more operating segments have the opportunity to offset
gains in one business unit with losses in another.
• Leverage: using debt instead of equity reduces the tax burden because interest
payments generally are a deductible business expense (cf. Internal Revenue
Service 2013b). Atwood et al. (1998) argue that a high-levered firm will hardly
have any leeway to further reduce tax payments, since the high deductions
from interests exhaust the possibilities to lower taxes.
They also include inventory intensity (inventory per total assets) and 5 industry dum-
mies in their regression, out of which only the coefficient for the service industry
is significant: service providers seem to be more likely to employ after-tax perfor-
mance measures.
While these studies give some insight for the design of our empirical analysis,
they might be subject to a selection bias. One could for example argue that it is
in the interest of the firms which incentivize their CEOs to reduce corporate tax
for example a fixed cost.
11Furthermore, several investment tax credit programs still exist to implement public policy goals,
such as renewable energy investment tax credits (cf. Internal Revenue Service 2013).
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payments to avoid that their conduct becomes public knowledge: if the tax author-
ities know that a firm sets incentives to keep taxes low, they might tend to increase
auditing efforts at that particular firm. As a consequence, firms that actively encour-
age their managers to keep taxes low might be the same ones that give inconclusive
information in their proxy statements (cf. Atwood et al. 1998 who had to drop 266
of their initial 672 observations), leading to a selective sample.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
We test empirically whether managerial bonus payments are related to corporate
income taxes, holding constant net profits. We do so by making use of a merged
dataset on executive compensation and firm characteristics. A brief discussion of
the dataset is given in Subsection 1, and our estimation approach is laid out in Sub-
section 2.
3.1 Compustat and ExecuComp Data
For our analysis we employ a dataset that was compiled from Standard & Poor’s
(S&P’s) Compustat and ExecuComp databases. The majority of the firms for which
ExecuComp data is available are listed in the S&P 1500 index. While it could be
argued that the focus on such a dataset limits the generalizability of our results, we
aim to offer an improvement over similar studies that were described in the last
section; not only does the S&P 1500 represent some 90% of the U.S. market capi-
talization (cf. Standard & Poor’s 2014), but it also lets us draw inferences concerning
smaller firms, since it is comprised of the S&P 500 (large-cap firms), the S&P 400
(mid-cap firms), and the S&P 600 (small-cap firms). In accordance with the litera-
ture (Phillips 2003, Desai and Dharmapala 2006, Rego and Wilson 2012), we limit
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our analysis to firms with positive pre-tax income.12 We further drop all firms that
are not incorporated in the United States in order to ensure a common institutional
framework for all analyzed firms. Finally, we discard observations that have a miss-
ing value for any of the variables that we use in the remainder of this paper so that
all estimations are undertaken with the same sample. This yields a dataset on 2,830
firms for the years 1992 to 2010, with some firms not covered in all years, yielding
21,921 datapoints. The sample attrition is documented in the appendix.
A first overview of the variables used in the analysis is offered in Table 1, stating
their means and ranges. The dependent variable bonus represents the total annual
bonus paid to the CEO and is measured in thousands of dollars. Both explanatory
variables are measured in millions of dollars and have been corrected for bonus ex-
penses: income, the firm’s net income, and incometax, the corresponding corporate
income tax.13 All firms have been matched to an industry according to four-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes; when these were unavailable an in-
dustry has been assigned based on the Compustat variable industry or, if unavail-
able too, on information from the company website. The dummy variable foreign
indicates whether or not a firm generates income abroad. We further generate indi-
cators based on the variables size, the firm’s total assets, capitalintensity, the ratio
of total property, plant, and equipment to total assets, and leverage, the ratio of
debt to total assets.
Table 2 gives the means of our three key variables in subsamples based on dif-
ferent categories. It shows that bigger firms tend to have higher net profits and
pay higher bonuses. The average bonus, however, increases relatively less than in-
come, which could be an indication that the sensitivity of the bonus to net income
decreases with firm size. Consistent with Murphy (1999), we can see notable differ-
12Note that we may still observe negative post-tax income.
13The procedure for correcting for bonus expenses is documented in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Means and Ranges of Variables, n=21921
Variable Mean SD Min Max
bonus 900 1694 0 76951
income 372 1284 -1130 45223
incometax 65 317 -396 10655
Agriculture and Mining 0.012 1.720 0 1
Communication 0.024 0.148 0 1
Construction 0.012 0.104 0 1
Electrics and Electronics 0.092 0.281 0 1
Financial Institutions 0.094 0.296 0 1
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0.033 0.178 0 1
Manufacturing 0.031 0.178 0 1
Oil and Gas 0.029 0.163 0 1
Other Industrials 0.238 0.429 0 1
Other Services 0.090 0.281 0 1
Real Estate 0.001 0.030 0 1
Software 0.056 0.237 0 1
Vehicles 0.030 0.178 0 1
Transportation 0.060 0.237 0 1
Utilities 0.066 0.252 0 1
Wholesale and Retail 0.132 0.341 0 1
foreign 0.472 0.503 0 1
size 10181 53989 0.148 2187631
capitalintensity 0.544 0.400 0 5.876
leverage 0.224 0.192 0 2.616
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Table 2: Conditional Means, n=21921
Subsample bonus income incometax
Small Firms 282.81 24.37 2.96
Medium-sized Firms 727.11 114.72 17.74
Large Firms 1874.00 1233.36 221.77
Agriculture and Mining 975.34 188.47 26.61
Communication 1803.71 975.65 175.25
Construction 2839.34 192.54 13.76
Electrics and Electronics 699.25 290.58 55.73
Financial Institutions 1712.16 632.62 49.69
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 1235.17 681.45 97.73
Manufacturing 629.50 317.67 19.27
Oil and Gas 1102.80 348.51 43.81
Other Industrials 817.51 454.98 101.73
Other Services 719.96 118.30 17.04
Real Estate 1698.86 202.14 19.21
Software 654.45 358.84 102.31
Vehicles 1117.69 511.10 91.15
Transportation 598.66 147.83 37.10
Utilities 526.39 284.37 76.15
Wholesale and Retail 718.37 247.14 29.59
No Foreign Income 783.36 251.20 37.35
Foreign Income 1036.44 506.82 96.07
Low Leverage 822.47 349.01 63.38
High Leverage 982.34 394.36 66.71
Low Capitalintensity 1005.18 372.51 56.50
High Capitalintensity 806.83 371.09 73.04
14
ences between industries in terms of bonus, income, and incometax. The average
firm in the Oil and Gas industry, for example, pays its CEO a bonus almost twice the
size than its counterpart in the Software industry, while their net income is com-
parable. Interestingly, they also pay much lower taxes. Firms that generate income
abroad have almost double the net income of domestic-only firms, while paying a
higher bonus and relatively more taxes.14 Highly-levered firms pay relatively less
taxes in comparison with lowly-levered firms, while paying a higher bonus. With
their net income almost exactly the same, firms with a low capital intensity also pay
a higher bonus and less taxes than companies with a high capital intensity.15
Note that these are univariate comparisons and that the differences in averages
could also be driven by level effects. It may be that larger firms pay a relatively
lower bonus because they can incentivize their CEOs more easily, either because
the prospect of a certain absolute amount of bonus payments suffices, or because
equity incentives are provided. It may just as well be the case that the relatively low
bonus can be explained as a punishment for relatively high tax payments. Likewise,
unobserved heterogeneity within an industry, or even within a firm, may necessitate
a certain level of bonus payments. A regression framework with fixed firm effects
allows us to relate variations in the bonus to variations in firm income and income
taxes, rather than only comparing the levels of averages.
14Note that this does not contradict Atwood et al.’s (1998) argument that firms with foreign oper-
ations have higher tax saving opportunities. An unobserved characteristic may cause these firms to
have a high tax burden, while still having many opportunities for tax savings.
15Idem. High capital intensity may come about with higher average income taxes and thereby give
more leeway to manipulate taxes.
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3.2 Econometric Framework
Each firm in our dataset has its own executive compensation plan and ideally one
would be able to make inferences about each individual bonus plan. Unfortunately,
we have less than eight observations per firm on average, not allowing us to do this.16
We thus resort to estimating a model that lets us make statements about the aver-
age bonus contract and later refine our analysis by focussing on several subsamples.
Our baseline specification controls for time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant
time effects:
bonusit = 1incomeit + 2incometaxit + i + t + "it; (1)
where bonusit denotes the realization of the bonus paid to the CEO by firm i in
year t, incomeit the firm’s net income before extraordinary expenses in that year,
and incometaxit the corresponding tax.
The company fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity that influences
the level of bonuses in a particular firm. Macroeconomic and other factors that
might affect the bonus in all firms in a given year are controlled for by the time
effects.
We can now easily test the following hypothesis:
H0:
2 = 0; (2)
holding net income constant, the bonus does not depend
on corporate income taxes.
16Note that  in  one of  his  robustness  checks, Gaertner (2013)  generates  a  variable indicating
whether a firm uses after-tax incentives with this very technique. Due to the low number of ob-
servations, however, he needs to resort to an uncommon threshold of significance.
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The coefficient 2 tells us the impact of the firm’s income tax payments on the
CEO’s bonus, holding constant firm income. If firm profits are taxed linearly, the
regression framework would not allow us to deduce statements on this effect, since
both explanatory variables would be perfectly collinear. Now, if we do find 2 to be
significantly different from zero, this is only caused by variations in incometax that
arise independently of those in income. As an example, consider a firm who pays
a bonus based only on net income. Now further assume that gross profits increase
simultaneously with a raise in the tax rate such that net profits remain exactly the
same. As a consequence, the CEO bonus remains unchanged while there was a
change in incometax, yielding a coefficient estimate of 2 = 0. If this weren’t the
case, we could deduce that the bonus must be tied to other measures than just net
income, for example to gross income, to another measure that correlates with it, or
even explicitly to tax payments themselves.
We can conceive the following combinations of coefficient estimates:
• 1 = 0; 2 = 0: we cannot show that CEO bonus payments are associated
with either corporate net income or corporate tax payments.
• 1 > 0; 2 = 0: while firms do incentivize their CEOs to increase net income,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the CEO bonus is independent of
corporate tax payments.
• 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 1  2: firms set incentives related to a mixture of pre-tax
and post-tax corporate income.
• 1 > 0; 2 < 0: in addition to rewarding increases in net rather than in gross
income, the firm sets further incentives to reduce corporate tax payments.
Our conjecture based on previous studies would be that we find a coefficient on
incometax that is lower than that of income. Note that this would be an average
17
result and would not mean it applies to all firms. While it might be possible that
some firms mix pre- and post-tax incentives in their bonus contracts, we expect firms
to use either one, possibly in combination with other incentives to reduce taxes. We
will explore whether there are any regularities concerning the coefficient estimates
conditional on observable firm characteristics with the following specification:
bonusit =
X
j
1jsubsamplejincomeit+
X
j
2jsubsamplejincometaxit+i+t+"it:
(3)
We divide the sample into subsamples based on industry and size. For the sake
of easier interpretation in a multivariate comparison of the coefficients of income
and incometax, we reformulate Equation 3 to:
bonusit = 11  incomeit + 21  incometaxit +
P
j 6=1 1j  subsamplej  incomeit(4)
+
P
j 6=1 2j  subsamplej  incometaxit + i + t + "it;
where the subsamples are generated based on tax planning opportunities in terms of
foreign operations, leverage, size, and capital intensity. The reference subsamples
are denoted by j = 1.
4 Results
This section exhibits the results obtained from regressing CEO bonus payments on
the corresponding firms’ net income and corporate income tax. The first subsection
presents the results of the baseline specification and its extensions, followed by a
discussion of possible limitations in Subsection 2.
4.1 Baseline Specification and Extensions
In this subsection, we present the results from estimating Equations 1, 3, and 4. The
baseline regression yields the following results (Table 3):
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Table 3: Baseline Specification, n=21921
Explanatory Variable Coefficient
income 0.338***
(0.013)
incometax -0.258***
(0.052)
Firm and Year effects Yes
Number of Firms 2830
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant time
effects. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses and significance at
the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
The results displayed in Table 3 imply that a one million dollar increase in a firm’s
net income is associated with an increase in the CEO’s bonus of 338 dollars.17 They
further allow us to reject the hypothesis that tax payments do not play a role in any
CEO’s bonus contract: holding net income constant, a reduction of payable taxes by
one million dollars comes about with a 258 dollar increase in the executive’s bonus.
This is a noteworthy result since it implies that shareholders reward an income in-
crease that comes from tax savings more strongly than other net income increases.
A possible explanation is that CEOs require to be compensated for the additional
risk borne in tax saving activities (cf. Chen and Chu 2005, and Rego and Wilson
2012). Bonus contracts that are based on more than one performance measure are
often designed in an additive fashion so that they can be thought of as a sum of sep-
arate bonus plans (cf. Murphy 1999). Our coefficient estimates could be the result
of such an additive bonus plan. Firms might, for example, base part of the bonus
on net income and explicitly reward a reduction of corporate taxes in another part
17Our estimate for the sensitivity of the bonus to firm income is considerably smaller than the
estimates for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder wealth which were mentioned in the
Introduction. Note that the bonus only accounts for a part of annual compensation and that it is a
flow variable, whereas CEO wealth is a stock variable, comprising all previous stock and option grants
among other elements. Furthermore, the value of these equity incentives is tied per definition to the
stock yield, and thus to shareholder wealth, whereas the bonus can depend on various measures.
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of the bonus.18 Whatever the case may be, this is still an average result and the lit-
erature presented above suggests that firms’ compensation practices differ across a
number of variables.
Table 4: Subsamples: Firm Size, n=21921
Subsample income incometax
Small Firms 3.241*** 1.980
(0.816) (3.725)
Medium-sized Firms 0.978*** -0.407
(0.113) (0.705)
Large Firms 0.337*** -0.251***
(0.013) (0.052)
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant time
effects. Medium-sized firms are the 50% of firms around the median firm in terms of size measured
by total assets. Small firms and large firms are the smallest and largest 25% of firms in terms of
total assets, respectively. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses
and significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Following Equation 3, we estimate the coefficients for income and incometax
separately for subsamples based on firm size and industry. Table 4 depicts the re-
sults for the subsamples based on firm size and lets us draw two conclusions: 1) The
larger a firm is, the lower is the sensitivity of the bonus to the firm’s net income.
While a one million dollar increase in net income leads to a bonus increase of 3241
dollars for small firms, the same increase in net income only leads to a bonus increase
of 337 dollars for a large firms. 2) Holding net income constant, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that tax payments do not affect the bonus in small and medium-sized
firms - it seems that CEOs in these companies are simply compensated based on
net profits and taxes do not play a role. Apparently, our results from the baseline
specification are driven by large firms, in which a one million dollar increase is asso-
ciated with a 251 dollar bonus increase.
18Ittner et al. (1997) find that some 8% of bonus plans reward “cost reduction”, which may comprise
tax expenses.
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We now repeat the analysis for different industries (Table 5). As was put forward
by Murphy (1999), there is quite some heterogeneity between the coefficient esti-
mates for the different industries. The results can be grouped into four categories:
• Positive income, insignificant incometax coefficients:19 While a higher net
income is accompanied by a higher bonus, we cannot reject our null hypothe-
sis, that is, we have no reason to believe tax payments have an impact on the
CEO’s bonus - over and above their direct effect on net income - for firms in
the Agriculture and Mining, Communication, Food, Beverages and Tobacco,
Oil and Gas, Real Estate, Vehicles, Utilities, and Other Service industries.
• Positive income, positive incometax coefficients: Firms in three industries pay
their CEOs a higher bonus when incometax is high, holding constant income.
One explanation could be that the bonus remuneration is based on gross-,
rather than net-income, at least for Financial Institutions. For the Construc-
tion and Transportation industries, however, the incometax coefficient esti-
mate is surprisingly high. One rationale behind this could be that CEOs are
in fact incentivized to generate high tax payments. This scenario could be rel-
evant if a company is (partly) under public ownership, like many public trans-
portation firms, or otherwise has an interest in high tax payments. It could
be argued that construction firms are exposed to a relatively high amount of
regulation, bureaucracy, and also business from public infrastructure projects
so that they might find it particularly opportune to propitiate the authorities
with tax payments.20
• Insignificant income, insignificant incometax coefficients: For firms in the
Manufacturing and Software industries we find no significant relationship be-
19We use the term “insignificant” when a coefficient is not significant at the 10% level.
20A report of Transparency International (2008) finds that the Construction industry is the one
most prone to bribery of public officials. In a similar fashion, firms in this industry might also tend
to “bribe” the authorities with high tax payments.
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tween the CEO’s bonus and either firm income or income taxes. This might
be due to the notion that managers’ interests in these sectors are only aligned
with those of the shareholders by means of equity incentives.21
• Positive  income, negative incometax coefficients: The results for firms in
Wholesale and Retail, Other Industrials, and Electrics and Electronics suggest
that on top of being remunerated on net- rather than gross income, CEOs are
incentivized to consider taxes as a profit center and to reduce corporate tax
payments. Especially for firms in the latter two industries, this seems plausi-
ble, since these companies often have tax saving opportunities, such as pro-
duction facilities abroad.
Following the interpretation of the results of the last category, we estimate Equa-
tion 4 incorporating indicators for the firms’ tax saving opportunities. The coeffi-
cient estimates are shown in Table 6. The results in the first column are particularly
interesting. The sensitivity of the bonus to income is not significantly different for
firms that have foreign operations and for those that do not. This could be seen as
an indication that the general CEO remuneration practices do not differ between
firms that only operate domestically and firms that also generate income abroad.
They do, however, differ vastly in the sensitivity of the bonus to incometax: after a
tax reduction of one million dollars, CEOs in firms with foreign operations receive
a bonus 629 dollars higher than a CEO in a domestic firm would receive. This can
be interpreted as an indication that internationally active firms have more tax sav-
ing opportunities than their domestic-only counterparts. As a consequence, they
reward tax savings more strongly. For CEOs in highly-levered firms (Column 2), the
21Consider for example Google’s former CEO and owner of a substantial amount of company
stock, Eric Schmidt, who receives a one-dollar salary and declines to benefit from a bonus plan (cf.
United States Securities and Exchange Comission 2011). However, in 2009, he still received a holiday
bonus of 1660 dollars. Clearly, this amount is independent of firm income or incometax and can vary
over time.
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Table 5: Subsamples: Industries, n=21921
Subsample income incometax
Agriculture and Mining 0.886** -0.091
(0.343) (2.058)
Communication 0.473*** -0.102
(0.058) (0.180)
Construction 9.970*** 17.411***
(0.399) (2.379)
Electrics and Electronics 0.756*** -2.154***
(0.056) (0.275)
Financial Institutions 0.597*** 0.362***
(0.028) (0.108)
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 0.729*** -0.581
(0.076) (0.395)
Manufacturing 0.033 0.347
(0.053) (1.678)
Oil and Gas 0.782*** 0.928
(0.097) (0.871)
Other Industrials 0.155*** -0.161**
(0.019) (0.073)
Other Services 1.327*** 0.937
(0.234) (0.899)
Real Estate 11.504** 27.947
(5.227) (23.748)
Software 0.080 0.054
(0.051) (0.192)
Transportation 0.387** 0.902*
(0.182) (0.512)
Vehicles 0.698*** -0.185
(0.057) (0.269)
Utilities 0.492*** 0.335
(0.139) (0.431)
Wholesale and Retail 0.685*** -1.150***
(0.060) (0.397)
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant time
effects. All firms have been matched to an industry based on SIC codes; when these were unavail-
able an industry has been assigned based on the Compustat variable industry or on the company
name. The sample period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses and significance at
the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Table 6: Tax Sheltering Opportunities, n=21921
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
income 0.348*** 0.335*** 0.447*** 1.118***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.130)
income*foreign 0.006 0.056**
(0.027) (0.028)
income*highleverage 0.059** 0.028
(0.024) (0.024)
income*highcapitalintensity -0.166*** -0.138***
(0.025) (0.026)
income*small 2.226***
(0.800)
income*large -0.717***
(0.126)
incometax 0.319*** -0.454*** -0.062 0.334
(0.112) (0.075) (0.062) (0.523)
incometax*foreign -0.629*** -0.629***
(0.114) (0.117)
incometax*highleverage 0.474*** 0.310***
(0.096) (0.097)
incometax*highcapitalintensity -0.335*** -0.375***
(0.098) (0.102)
incometax*small 2.310
(3.697)
incometax*large 0.039
(0.510)
Notes: the dependent variable is the bonus paid to the CEO. income is the firm’s net income
corrected for bonus expenses. incometax is the corresponding payable income tax, also corrected
for bonus expenses. The specification includes time-invariant firm effects and firm-invariant time
effects. For the univariate results based on size-subsamples, see Table 4. The indicator variables
are equal to one if: foreign - the firm has nonzero foreign income (10340 firms), highleverage
- the firm’s leverage is above the median value, highcapitalintensity - the firm’s capital intensity
is above the median value, small - the firm belongs to the smallest 25% of firms in terms of total
assets, large - the firm belongs to the largest 25% of firms in terms of total assets. The sample
period is 1992 to 2010. Standard errors are in parentheses and significance at the 1% , 5% , and
10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
24
negative coefficient for incometax is almost exactly offset by the interaction term.
Apparently the reasoning laid out in Atwood et al. (1998) seems to apply: firms that
are financed with relatively more debt already save taxes by declaring interest pay-
ments as a business expense, limiting their possibilities to further reduce incometax.
Thus, CEOs in those firms are not specifically incentivized to do so. Also in accor-
dance with their findings, capital-intense firms highly encourage tax reductions in
comparison with less capital-intense firms (Column 3).
Note that this is a univariate comparison of the coefficients for income and in-
cometax. In order to alleviate this concern, we estimate the model with all tax sav-
ing indicators, in addition to firm size, at once (Column 4). The coefficients for
the different interaction terms now give the slope effect of tax saving opportuni-
ties compared to the reference group of mid-sized companies with only domestic
operations, low leverage, and low capital intensity. The effects of tax planning op-
portunities on the sensitivity of the bonus to corporate income taxes remain qual-
itatively unchanged. Nonetheless, the interaction terms of incometax and size are
insignificant. The interpretation of this result is that, in comparison to mid-sized,
domestic-only, low-levered companies with low capital intensity, company size does
not have a significant effect on the sensitivity of the bonus to income tax.
4.2 Discussion
After finding out which CEOs are given incentives to reduce corporate taxes, the
obvious next step would be to find out whether these incentives work and such ex-
ecutives actually do reduce tax payments. Using different firm-level proxies for tax-
reduction incentives, studies like Phillips (2003), Armstrong et al. (2012), or Gaert-
ner (2013) find evidence on this, which could give rise to concerns about reverse
causality. However, our study presents results of the relationship between intra-firm
variations in taxes and variations of bonus payments, while the mentioned studies
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find an effect of variations in this very relationship on variations of a function of
tax payments. One is generally confronted with a problem of reverse causality when
one wants to estimate the effect of B on A, but in reality, A (also) causes variations
in B. In our context, this could be the case when, for example, an increase in the sen-
sitivity of the bonus to the firm’s tax payments leads him to reduce corporate taxes,
which is not just a possibility, but a conjecture that motivates our study. Nonethe-
less, this concern does not pose a problem for our study since the bonus contract
specifies ex ante how variations in tax payments will impact the manager’s bonus.
The CEO observes this contract and undertakes the actions that maximize his util-
ity. This will yield a realization of tax payments, according to which his bonus is
calculated and paid out. We are interested in the contracted relationship between
taxes and bonus and our data allow us to estimate this relationship, regardless of
whether or not it induces the CEO to undertake actions aimed at reducing tax pay-
ments.
It could be argued that we are prone to spurious results because of omitted vari-
ables that may affect CEO bonuses. In principle, it is conceivable that such left-out
variables are correlated with both, income and tax. As an example, imagine a CEO’s
bonus is tied to the total revenue and to the return on assets of his firm. While nei-
ther income nor tax are explicitly mentioned in his bonus contract, our estimation
setup could yield significant coefficients for both measures. This is so because total
revenue determines both measures and return on assets is a function of net income.
This is, however, acceptable for our analysis, since this mechanism entails that the
CEO is in fact incentivized implicitly to manipulate net income and taxes.
Finally, it must be noted that when we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficient on incometax is equal to zero, this does not have to be the case because
taxes do in fact not play a role in the CEO’s bonus plan; it is possible that this
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occurs due to a lack of variations in incometax that are independent of variations in
income. However, in most cases we do find significant coefficients on incometax,
which allows us to dismiss this concern. If anything, it supports the view that we
give a lower bound of the statistical significance of our coefficient estimates.
5 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper was to test whether CEOs’ bonus contracts set incentives
to reduce corporate tax payments. Our study shows this is indeed the case when
looking at the whole sample, where we find that bonuses increase with tax reduc-
tions, while controlling for net income. In some instances, however, the contrary is
the case; CEOs in the Construction and Transportation industries even seem to be
incentivized to generate high tax payments. It appears that the result of the estima-
tion over the whole sample is driven by firms in the Wholesale and Retail, Electrics
and Electronics, and Other Industrial sectors, which account for almost half of the
sample. In accordance with previous literature, we further find that a number of
proxies for tax planning opportunities are related to a high negative sensitivity of
the bonus to income tax payments.
These results provide a lower-bound estimate of the CEO’s incentives to reduce
corporate taxes, since equity compensation that is paid in addition to the bonus
automatically sets such incentives. Keeping this in mind, our results are particularly
noteworthy, since they imply that a profit increase from tax savings is rewarded more
strongly than profit increases from other sources. A possible explanation could be
that running an aggressive tax strategy is not only costly to the CEO in terms of
effort, but it could also bear additional risk for him. This hypothesis is in line with
Gaertner (2013). Apart from a potentially higher volatility of firm fundamentals, and
thus of the bonus payments, the executive might incur personal risks such as a loss
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of reputation (cf. Rego and Wilson 2012), or even the threat of legal prosecution.
Federal law (cf. Office of the Law Revision Counsel 2010) subjects all responsible
persons who willfully retain due taxes from the government to a penalty equal to
the taxes withheld. A decision of the United States District Court Middle District
of Florida Tampa Division (2009) shows that a CEO can indeed be considered a
“responsible person” and can be held personally liable for withholding taxes from
the government.
From a shareholders’ perspective, setting such incentives makes sense if the ex-
pected gains from running an aggressive tax strategy exceed the expected costs from
potential risk to firm value and from incentivizing the CEO. Graetz (2008) postu-
lates that “a tax shelter is a deal done by very smart people that, absent tax consider-
ations, would be very stupid” (p. 116). From an economist’s perspective, the conduct
of incentivizing a CEO to act in such a “very stupid” way can be seen as an instance
of rent seeking; it is a costly activity that leads to a redistribution, rather than the
production, of wealth.
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Appendix
Sample Attrition
The total number of observations is reached as follows.
Table 7: Sample Attrition
Observations with... Number of Observations
Match in Compustat and Execucomp 29379
Missing values for any variable -2205
Negative pre-tax income -4824
Foreign incorporation -428
Negative bonus -1
Total 21921
Correction for compensation expenses
Since it would be counterintuitive if a company rewarded the CEO for tax savings
due to expenses for his own bonus (cf. Chen and Chu 2005), we correct our two
main explanatory variables income and incometax for bonus expense. Consider the
following simple model of linear profit taxation:
gross = net + T = (1  )gross +   gross = R  C1   C2; (5)
where  denotes profits,  the tax rate and T , R, C1, C2 are payable income taxes,
revenue, business expenses, and CEO bonus expenses, respectively. We observe
net, T , andC2 and want to construct a measure of net profits before bonus expense,
^net, and a measure of income taxes before bonus expense, T^ . Since
gross = net + T = (1  )(R  C1   C2) + (R  C1   C2); (6)
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we get that
^net = (1  )(R C1) = (1  )(R C1 C2)+ (1  )C2 = net+(1  )C2; (7)
and likewise
T^ = (R  C1) = (R  C1   C2) + C2 = T + C2: (8)
Using that  = T
net+T
, these variables can readily be constructed with the variables
in our dataset.
Variable Definitions
The variables we use have the following relationship to Compustat / ExecuComp
items.
Table 8: Variable Definitions
Variable Compustat/ExecuComp Item
bonus BONUS +NONEQ_INCENT
income IB + (1  TXP
IB+TXP
)(BONUS +NONEQ_INCENT )
incometax TXP + TXP
IB+TXP
(BONUS +NONEQ_INCENT )
size AT
foreign 1 if PIFO 6= 0
leverage DLTT+DLC
AT
capitalintensity PPEGT
AT
Notes
The expressions “income” and “profits” are used interchangeably. Unless otherwise
noted, they refer to the after-tax measure.
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Similarly, expressions such as ”tax avoidance”, ”tax sheltering”, or ”tax evasion”
are used synonymously and are not supposed to indicate whether the activity is legal
or not, unless otherwise noted.
The variable bonus is measured in thousands of dollars; all other dollar-measures
are given in millions of dollars.
Dates are expressed in compliance with ISO 8601.
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